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Abstract—Spoofing is the act of masquerading as a valid user
by falsifying data to gain an illegitimate access. Vulnerability of
recognition systems to spoofing attacks (presentation attacks) is
still an open security issue in biometrics domain and among all
biometric traits, face is exposed to the most serious threat, since
it is particularly easy to access and reproduce. In the literature,
many different types of face spoofing attacks have been examined
and various algorithms have been proposed to detect them.
Mainly focusing on 2D attacks forged by displaying printed
photos or replaying recorded videos on mobile devices, a sig-
nificant portion of these studies ground their arguments on the
flatness of the spoofing material in front of the sensor. However,
with the advancements in 3D reconstruction and printing tech-
nologies, this assumption can no longer be maintained. In this
paper, we aim to inspect the spoofing potential of subject-specific
3D facial masks for different recognition systems and address
the detection problem of this more complex attack type.
In order to assess the spoofing performance of 3D masks
against 2D, 2.5D and 3D face recognition and to analyse various
texture based countermeasures using both 2D and 2.5D data,
a parallel study with comprehensive experiments is performed
on two datasets: The Morpho database which is not publicly
available and the newly distributed 3D Mask Attack Database
(3DMAD).
Index Terms—spoofing, presentation attack, face recognition,
mask attack
I. INTRODUCTION
B eing the most commonly used biometric trait by humans,face recognition has become an active research topic
for many decades now and it has found great application
in consumer electronics and software. Face owes its repu-
tation mainly to being easily and non-intrusively accessible
compared to other biometric traits like finger print or iris.
However, this advantage becomes a weakness in malicious
circumstances, enabling attackers to create copies and spoof
face recognition systems without any difficulties.
Spoofing attack is the act of outwitting a biometric system
by presenting a fake evidence in order to gain authentica-
tion [1]. It is relatively simple to forge such an attack for facial
recognition systems, due to the fact that the photographs or
videos of a valid user can be easily captured from a distance
or obtained via internet, e.g. through social networks. Valid
users (simply users or clients) can be defined as the persons
that are enrolled in a face recognition system. An attacker can
attempt to gain access by simply showing their printed photos
or replaying their recorded videos to the sensor.
This apparent vulnerability of face has evoked great interest
in the biometric community and many papers have been pub-
lished on countermeasure studies. Mainly as a result of their
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simplicity and low-cost, the previously mentioned photo print
and video replay attacks [2] constitute the focus of research
activities in this domain. Existing anti-spoofing approaches
against these type of attacks can be roughly classified into
three groups: texture analysis, motion analysis and liveness
detection.
Assuming the presence of cues like printing artefacts [3]
and/or blurring [4], many anti-spoofing techniques examine
the texture of the captured face image. Similarly, in a recent
study [5], micro-texture analysis using multi-scale local binary
patterns is proposed. It can be argued that this type of
approaches highly depends on the quality of the printed image
or video display.
The second group of methods aims to detect spoofing
attacks by analysing the motion in the scene based on the fact
that planar objects like a sheet of paper or a mobile phone
screen move in a significantly different way compared to real
faces. For example, in [6], the trajectories of small regions of
face images are examined to be classified as real or fake. In a
similar manner, by computing geometric invariants of a set of
automatically located facial points, Marsico et al. [7] exploit
the same phenomenon.
Finally in the last group of methods, liveness of the face
is determined based on live-face specific gestures such as
eye blinking [8] or lip movements [9]. However, approaches
of this kind are bound to fail in the case of video replay
attacks or even more simply, with photographic masks which
are actually high resolution facial prints worn on face after
the eyes and mouth regions are cut out, as claimed in [10].
Similarly in [11], it is again shown that with eyes cut out from
the photos, traditional visible liveness detection method still
detects blinking, in other words, cannot distinguish a photo
attack.
Recently, several studies have been published that present
methodical and reproducible analyses of several of these and
some other methods, with a shared purpose of providing
comparable results on public databases [12], [13], [14].
Work on fraud detection capabilities for face is still limited
and a substantial part of it is based on the flatness of the
captured surface in front of the sensor during an attack. This
is also true for approaches that examine the 3D nature of the
face by employing additional devices, which is much more
realistic now with the introduction of affordable consumer
depth cameras like Kinect. For instance, in [15], 3D data
acquired with a low-cost sensor is utilized to localize face
and at the same time to test its authenticity to decrease their
system’s vulnerability to spoofing attacks.
Unfortunately, methods that depend on the assumption of a
planar surface for a fake face are rendered futile in case of 3D
facial mask attacks [16]. With the help of the advancements
in 3D manufacturing technologies, easily attainable facial
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masks take the spoofing attacks one step further and introduce
new challenges for counter measure studies. To the best of
our knowledge, there have been very few studies published
addressing this issue and they are detailed in the next section.
II. RELATED WORK
The earliest studies in mask detection aim to distinguish
between facial skin and mask materials by exploiting the
difference in their reflectance characteristics. This idea can
be traced 30 years back to [17], which claims that a face
thermogram is not vulnerable to disguises and even plastic
surgery can be detected, since it reduces the thermal signature
of face. Later, stating that disguises can be detected even
better in near-infrared, Pavlidis and Symosek propose to utilize
the 1.3-1.7 µm sub-band of the upper band [18]. Simple
thresholding is suggested for classification, without reporting
any experimental results, but only illustrations.
Two more studies that follow the same way of thinking
are published with systematic experiments and results [19],
[11]. A multi-spectral analysis is proposed in both, claiming
that fake, by its definition, is indistinguishable for human eyes
and therefore, using only visual images is not sufficient to
detect the attacks. On the other hand, they both handle the
mask attack problem in an evasion/disguise scenario rather
than spoofing since they don’t examine masks that are replicas
of valid users to be impersonated.
In [19], the authors conduct experiments on different mask
materials such as silicon, latex or skin-jell to see how different
they behave in reflectance when compared to facial skin
that is sampled from the forehead region. For this purpose,
the distribution of albedo values for illumination at various
wavelengths are analysed and two best wavelengths, one from
visual and one from near-infrared spectrum (685 and 850 nm)
are selected. Finally, the resulting 2D vectors that consist of
radiance measurements under these illuminations and strictly
at a distance of 30cm from the sensor are classified as skin
or non-skin via Fisher’s linear discriminant. The method is
reported to detect fake faces with 97.78% classification rate.
However, the possibility of occlusion in the forehead region
and the imposed range limitation restricts practical application.
Additionally, in this study, masks don’t even exist since the
analyses are done directly on mask materials.
Similarly in [11], two discriminative wavelengths (850 and
1450 nm) are selected after examining the albedo curves of
facial skin and mask materials with varying distances. An
SVM classifier is trained to discriminate between genuine and
fake attempts and tested on a database of 20 masks of different
materials: 4 plastic, 6 silica gel, 4 paper pulp, 4 plaster and
2 sponge. The results show that the method can achieve a
classification rate of 89.18%. This work improves the state of
the art by eliminating the range limitation and experimenting
on real facial masks. On the other hand, no analysis of how
well the spoofing attacks perform could be presented, since
although the masks are face-like, they do not mimic any real
person.
Apart from lacking this analysis on spoofing performances
of the masks, another limitation with these two studies [11],
[19] is that they are not very convenient due to their special ex-
pensive hardware requirements, as stated by the same authors
in [20].
Lately, a different line of research in spoofing with masks
has been published by Kose et al. for which a non-public
database composed of printed 3D masks of 16 users is uti-
lized [21], [22], [23], [24]. To construct the database (referred
as Morpho database), the face models of clients are acquired
by a 3D laser scanner and the masks are manufactured using
a 3D printing service. In addition to texture images, 3D
frontal face models are also made available in the Morpho
database for both real and attack samples. More details on
this database will be given in Section III-A. In their first two
papers, the authors present a vulnerability analysis on 2D,
2.5D and 3D face recognition systems against 3D mask attacks
and propose a micro-texture analysis based counter measure
applied separately on color images and depth maps.
In [22], three baseline face recognition algorithms are
implemented to observe the spoofing performances of the
masks. In their experiments, a probe sample is compared
to the enrolment (gallery) sample of the claimed ID and a
binary decision is made based on a similarity metric. In their
analysis, the authors do not designate an enrolment set, but
instead they employ a method that is referred as all vs all
and propose two scenarios. In the first scenario, the baseline
performance is assessed by only using the real access samples
(DB-r) in the database. Each DB-r sample is compared with
all other DB-r samples. This results in two types of scores:
real genuine scores if the compared samples belong to the
same user and real impostor scores, otherwise. In the second
scenario which is referred as the mode under spoofing attacks,
mask attack samples (DB-m) are utilized as the probe set. Each
sample in DB-m is compared with all DB-r samples, again
resulting in two types of scores, that is mask genuine and mask
impostor scores. The results are reported for both identification
and verification settings as rank-1 close-set identification and
Equal Error Rates (EER), respectively.
Although this analysis gives an idea about the spoofing po-
tential of 3D facial masks, it suffers from two major problems.
Firstly, one can strongly argue that spoofing is irrelevant in a
close-set identification setting. This is because the probe will
always be assigned to an identity in the gallery irrespective of
the attack quality. Identity match can be achieved as long as
the mask better resembles the target, compared to enrolment
samples of other IDs. Secondly, in the verification setting
considered for the second scenario, mask impostor scores
are obtained by matching DB-m images to DB-r samples of
IDs different than the one targeted by the attack. This is
irrational since no attacker would produce an attack for a
valid user and claim the identity of another. Additionally, the
verification setting does not really evaluate the vulnerability
of the recognition systems since apart from the algorithms
used, their specifications, e.g. operating thresholds, are not
determined and fixed using a development set. The correct
approach would be to evaluate mask genuine scores against
real genuine scores, which congregates the two scenarios in
one score space and enables us to calculate false acceptance
rates at the same operating point for both real and fake access
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scenarios.
In [21], a Local Binary Pattern (LBP) based counter measure
to detect mask attacks is tested on two modes: color images
and depth maps. 1 A depth map is also a grayscale image
which contains information relating to the distance of the
surfaces of 3D objects from a viewpoint. Multi-scale LBP
features are extracted from both 2D and 2.5D images and a
linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier is trained to
determine whether a feature belongs to a real or an attack
sample. A training set is utilized which does not overlap with
the testing partition. The results are presented separately for
2D and 2.5D modes as correct classification rates that are
calculated at the thresholds giving best performances. Since
a development partition does not exist, the thresholds are
optimized on the test scores.
Later in [23], two fusion schemes, at feature and score
levels, are proposed to combine previously proposed LBP
histograms calculated from the 2D and 2.5D images. Clas-
sification results are given in the same previous manner; best
performances obtained by tuning the decision threshold on the
test set. While the 2D and 2.5D modes give 89.4% and 82.4%
classification rates separately, the fusion of these two modes
increases this rate to 93.5%. Additionally, a proper analysis
is included in the paper on the impact of the mask attacks
and the proposed counter measure method on two baseline
(2D and 3D) face recognition algorithms. The detection error
trade-off (DET) plots reveal that without any counter measures
3D masks can be highly detrimental to both 2D and 3D face
recognition performances.
The authors explore another type of counter measure tech-
nique based on reflectance analysis in [24]. The proposed
method utilize the variational retinex algorithm to decom-
pose face texture images into reflectance and illumination
components. Lastly, a linear SVM classifier is applied to
classify reflectance images as masks or real faces. Again the
performance evaluation is done without using a development
set and results are reported as best possible classification rate.
With these last additions to the literature in the domain
of face spoofing using 3D masks, the studies have definitely
gained momentum. However, apart from the previously men-
tioned shortcomings, they unfortunately comprise a major
obstacle to reproducible and comparable research: the utilized
database is not available for public use.
Bearing these points in mind, in our paper we pursue three
main purposes:
• Describing the first public spoofing database with facial
masks, called 3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD) in
detail, along with complete protocols for experimentation.
• Presenting a very detailed baseline analysis on spoofing
performances of each mask in this database against state-
of-the-art 2D, 2.5D and 3D face recognition systems.
• Reporting comparative experimental results on two
databases which will act as the missing link between the
previous studies that have been done on Morpho database
and the future studies that will be based on 3DMAD.
1By color, it is referred to the texture images obtained by the 3D scanner
which are actually in grayscale. In our paper, we will refer to grayscale texture
images as 2D and to depth maps as 2.5D.
For reproducibility purposes, in addition to distributing the
database, the source codes to generate the reported results are
also made freely available to public use.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The two mask
spoofing databases are described in detail in Section III. Three
baseline face recognition algorithms and comparatively studied
counter measure techniques are explained in Section IV and
V, respectively. In Section VI, experimental results on the two
database for both their spoofing capabilities and anti-spoofing
performances of the implemented counter measure methods
are provided. Finally, the paper is concluded with remarks on
the future work in Section VII.
III. MASK ATTACK DATABASES
In this section, we will give detailed information about the
two spoofing databases for which 3D masks are utilized to
generate the attacks.
A. Morpho Database
Morpho database is a non-public database which was col-
lected by MORPHO2 in the context of the TABULA RASA
project3. It consists of 207 real access and 199 mask attack
samples, in both 2D and 3D (facial images and 3D models).
Subject-specific masks used for spoofing attempts are man-
ufactured by a 3D printer using facial models of 16 different
users, acquired with a 3D scanner. The texture of the masks is
grayscale and their shapes are accurate replicas of the targeted
clients.
For Morpho database, all recordings are done in a single
session for both real accesses and mask attacks. A 3D scanner
which uses a structured light technology is utilized to take
different number of shots (varying between 9-15) for each user.
20 users are recorded in total of which only 16 had printed
masks. For each shot, three manually annotated points (two for
outer eye corners and one for the nose tip) are also included
in the database.
As the acquisition process with the employed 3D scanner is
really sensitive to movement, the cooperation of the clients are
required. This requirement hinders the access to facial shape
that is crucial to mask manufacture for the attackers.
B. 3D Mask Attack Database
The 3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD) is a face spoofing
database which currently contains 76500 frames of 17 different
users, recorded using Microsoft Kinect sensor for both real-
access and spoofing attacks using 3D facial masks. Each frame
consists of:
• a depth image (640× 480 pixels - 1× 11 bits)
• the corresponding color image (640× 480 pixels - 3× 8
bits)
• manually annotated eye positions (with respect to the
color image)
The production of the database can be divided into two
stages: manufacturing the 3D masks and recording the videos
that will be explained in detail in the following subsections.
2http://www.morpho.com
3http://www.tabularasa-euproject.org/
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(a) Two example shots from Morpho (b) Example paper-craft mask from 3DMAD (c) 17 hard resin masks from 3DMAD
Fig. 1. (a) The top row shows a real access from a user in grayscale texture (2D), depth map (2.5D) and 3D model format while an attacker wearing the
same user’s mask is displayed in the bottom (b-c) Facial masks obtained from ThatsMyFace.com
1) Manufacturing the 3D Masks:
In [25], it is stated that spoofing attacks using 3D facial
masks cannot become a common practice in the literature,
mainly because of the high cost of client-like masks. However,
recently 3D printing services have sprung up and become a
rapidly growing market, unfortunately, smoothing the way for
different mask attack possibilities to face recognition systems.
The technique used to manufacture the masks in the Morpho
database requires the 3D models of the valid users to be
captured in order to be constructed using a regular 3D printer.
Although 3D scanner technologies are advancing remarkably,
range limitations and constraint for user cooperation still
exist. For this reason, unconsciously taking hold of a proper
3D face model that belongs to a valid user, possibly from
a distance is highly impractical. In order to produce the
masks for our database, we used a particular service called
ThatsMyFace.com which stands out with its specialization in
facial reconstruction and in transforming 2D portraiture into
3D sculptures, among other options.
Using this company, it is possible for a 3D face model
constructed using frontal and profile images of a person to be
printed and delivered to your mailbox in several forms such as
a head on an action figure or a wearable life-size mask in hard
resin or a paper-cut file. Its website allows the customers to
view and inspect the generated face model before ordering it.
Obviously, the main advantage of this service over the others
is the possibility of utilizing regular facial images to create a
3D model. Because unlike 3D scans, photographs of the users
can be easily captured form a distance or found on the internet.
For 3DMAD, one frontal and two profile face images are
taken from 17 different users and uploaded on ThatsMy-
Face.com. For each user, a life-size wearable mask and a
paper-craft mask is ordered. The uploaded images which
were used in the reconstruction of the 3D face models are
also available in the database together with the paper-craft
mask files (see Figure 1-a), for possible future use, making
it possible for other researchers to create their own spoofs.
However, they are not included in the scope of this study. In
Figure 1-b, the 17 wearable masks made out of a hard resin
composite in full 24-bit color with holes at the eyes and the
nostrils are displayed with a sample paper mask crafted only
for illustration purposes.
Unfortunately, the size of the database could not be larger
due to the high cost of the 3D facial masks. On the other hand,
more samples can always be collected from the same masks
under different conditions.
In conclusion, masks used for 3DMAD differs from the
ones for Morpho database in several points. Firstly and most
importantly, the 3D shapes of the masks in 3DMAD are not
precisely correct as it is the case with Morpho database since
the reconstructed models are only approximately computed
from 2D images. The resulting mask quality depends on the
input images as well as the performance of the reconstruction
algorithm. Secondly, for 3DMAD masks, the eyes and the
nostrils are cut out while the facial surface is complete in
the Morpho database. Lastly, the mask textures are in 24-bit
color for 3DMAD whereas they are in grayscale in the other.
2) Recording of the Database:
Microsoft Kinect for Xbox 360 is utilized to record all
samples in the database both for real accesses and mask
attacks. Its sensor captures both color and depth data in the
scene at 30 frames per second. The main reason behind the
selection of this device over other conventional cameras is
the additionally provided depth information, which makes it
possible:
• to explore the attacks and devise countermeasures in 3D,
• to analyse the vulnerability of 3D face recognition sys-
tems to mask attacks
in addition to their 2D counterparts.
The data is collected in three different sessions for all users
and in each session 5 videos of 10 seconds length are captured.
The first two sessions are held two weeks apart in which real
access samples are collected. Whereas in the third session,
mask attacks that are performed by a single operator (attacker)
are captured. As a result, 255 color and depth videos of 300
frames are recorded in total. Additionally, for each video, the
eye positions are manually labelled for every 60th frame and
then, they are linearly interpolated for the rest in between.
For all three sessions, the recording conditions are very
well-controlled. The users are recorded directly facing the
sensor in front of a uniform background and under good
illumination which is adjusted to minimize the shadows cast
on their faces. In Figure 2, three sample from three sessions
for the same user is given as an example.
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Fig. 2. Example color (top row) and depth (bottom row) images from three
different sessions for a user in 3DMAD. The first two are real accesses while
in the third, an attacker is wearing the user’s mask.
IV. BASELINE FACE RECOGNITION ALGORITHMS
Before moving on to develope counter measures against
mask attacks, it is important to assert the threat they pose on
the security of face recognition systems. In other words, it is
required to evaluate the vulnerability of commonly employed
face recognition algorithms to these type of spoofing attempts.
In our previous paper [26], we have examined the spoofing
performances of a subset of masks (that belong to the test-
ing set) in 3DMAD using a 2D face recognition algorithm
that is based on Inter Session Variability (ISV) modelling
method [27]. Due to the fact that, the dataset was divided into
non-overlapping sets for training, development and testing, it
was not possible to evaluate every mask.
In this study, we extend the previous analysis in three
directions:
• The impact of masks are also evaluated for additional
2.5D and 3D systems.
• Experiments are done in leave-one-out manner so that all
masks can be analysed.
• Morpho database is also included so that a connection is
established from the current state of the art to possible
future studies.
In [22] and [23], the authors also evaluate the spoofing
success of the masks in the Morpho database on a 2D, a 2.5D
and a 3D face recognition algorithm. For 2D and 2.5D, LBP
histograms are extracted and compared using the χ2 distance
metric for both 2D and 2.5D images. For 3D face matching,
Thin Plate Spline (TPS) warping parameters are obtained by
aligning each face model with a generic one and comparison
is done by computing cosine distances between corresponding
feature vectors [28].
In a similar manner to these studies, ISV algorithm is se-
lected to be applied on both grayscale texture images and depth
maps for 2D and 2.5D face recognition, respectively. As for the
3D, since both databases do not include any facial expressions,
Iterative Closest Point (ICP) method is selected to register
surface pairs to each other and ICP error is simply taken as
a measure of how well they match. Many early studies for
3D face recognition propose this convention [29], [30], [31].
These algorithms are selected simply to expand the number
of different face recognition methods whose vulnerabilities
are analysed against 3D mask attacks. Investigation for more
recent or more advanced methods is not the point of this work.
A. ISV method for 2D and 2.5D face recognition
Inter Session Variability (ISV) modelling, originally devel-
oped for speaker recognition, is applied for face recognition
task [27]. Enrolled clients are described with Gaussian Mixture
Models (GMM) that are built on set of blocks of pixels
extracted from their images in the gallery. ISV aims to make
these client models more reliable by eliminating within-client
(inter-session) variation.
Initially, 12 × 12 blocks are exhaustively sampled from
the facial image by moving the sampling window one pixel
at a time. Next, mean and variance normalisation is applied
and the first 45 2D DCT coefficients (lowest frequency) are
extracted. Based on the distribution of these feature vectors, a
GMM is estimated using background model (UBM) adaptation
for each client. Finally, ISV modelling is applied to exclude
the within-client variation, by assuming it is contained in
a linear subspace of the GMM mean super-vector space
and estimating subspaces via maximum likelihood and latent
variables via maximum a posteriori adaptation. More details
on the algorithm can be found in [27].
Like most of the existing 2D face recognition methods [32],
ISV can also be adopted for facial shape information in 2.5D.
B. ICP method for 3D face recognition
Iterative Closest Point (ICP) algorithm is a well-established
technique used for rigid registration of 3D surfaces [33]. In
order to minimize the distance between two cloud points
(which is the sum of distances calculated for all points in
one of the surfaces, finding the closest point on the other),
ICP computes and revises the translation and rotation iter-
atively. This registration is used to establish point-to-point
correspondences between two face models. Additionally, the
final minimized distance, ICP error, can also be employed
directly to compare them [29], [30], [31]. In fact, this is the
chosen approach for our 3D face recognition baseline system.
Two main shortcomings of ICP are that it needs a good
initialization for an accurate result and it cannot handle non-
rigid transformation which is crucial in the presence of surface
deformations, such as occlusions or facial expressions. But
then, these issues are irrelevant in our case, since in both
databases face samples are neutral and frontal.
As mentioned before, 3D face recognition in particular and
face recognition in general is not the focus of this paper. We
are aware that there exist many other more powerful methods
but we are just interested in providing a baseline study on
the vulnerabilities to 3D mask attacks that is open-source and
available for the research community to reuse.
V. ANTI-SPOOFING ALGORITHMS
As explained in the Introduction section, it is more difficult
to detect 3D mask attacks with motion analysis and liveness
detection methods. For this reason, texture analysis remains
as a more reliable approach that can be adopted. Naturally,
human skin is different from mask materials with its optical
characteristics, such as reflectance or scattering. This fact facil-
itates utilization of texture properties to discriminate between
real faces and masks.
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Fig. 3. Extended set of LBPs: (a) conventional LBP; (b) 8-bit coded modified
LBP (mLBP); (c) transition coded LBP (tLBP) (d) direction coded LBP [36]
Local Binary Patterns (LBP) is a simple and efficient texture
operator which has become a popular approach in various
computer vision applications [34]. As a matter of fact, LBP
and its variations have been successfully applied in counter
measures against 2D spoofing attacks [5], [35]. Moreover,
Kose et al. evaluated the effectiveness of an LBP based mi-
cro texture-analysis technique in 3D face anti-spoofing using
Morpho database [21], [23].
In [21], the multi-scale LBP based feature vector proposed
in [5] against photo print attacks is utilized to detect 3D
masks. For this purpose, it is applied separately on 2D and
2.5D images and classification rates are reported to be 89.4%
and 82.4%, respectively. Later in [23], two modes are fused at
feature and score levels to achieve higher success rates (93.0%
and 93.5%).
In our work, we aim to study and compare discriminative
properties of various types of LBP operators including the one
proposed in [5] in real face / mask classification, using both
3DMAD and Morpho databases.
A. Extraction of LBP based features
The original LBP value for each pixel is calculated by
comparing its adjacent pixels in 3 × 3 neighbourhood with
the value of that pixel and forming a 8-bit binary number
from the results (LBP8,1) [34]. A common extension to the
original operator is to eliminate patterns with more that two
bitwise transition. This reduces the number of different labels
and results in 59 uniform patterns (LBPu28,1). The LBP operator
can also be extended to use neighbourhoods of various size
(different circle radius (R) and different number of sampling
points (P) - LBPP,R) or to change the encoding method.
The occurrences of the LBP labels in the whole image or
in blocks are collected into histograms and then considered as
feature vectors to be classified.
In [5], three types of LBP histograms are computed and
concatenated: LBPu28,1 from 3 × 3 overlapping blocks of face
image (of size 59 × 9 = 531), LBPu28,2 and LBPu216,2 from the
whole image (of size 59 and 234, respectively). It results in
an enhanced feature histogram of length 833.
In this manuscript, three more extensions from [36] are
included and analyzed: modified (mLBP), transitional (tLBP)
and direction-coded (dLBP). Instead of the pixel value, the
mLBP uses the average of the neighbouring pixels for compar-
ison. In tLBP, two consecutive neighbour pixels are compared
circularly in clock-wise direction and in dLBP, intensity vari-
ation is encoded for only four base directions into two bits,
again resulting in 8-bit value (see Figure 3).
Additionally, the influence of dividing face images into
blocks is assessed for each extended LBP type. The face image
is broken into 3 × 3 non-overlapping blocks after the LBP
values are computed. Histograms are calculated separately for
each block and the final feature vector is formed by concate-
nation. In [14], block processing methodology is concluded to
be ineffectual for detection of 2D spoofing attacks.
B. Feature classification
Since the extracted LBP codes are collected into histograms,
the classification can be simply performed by computing
histogram similarities. So firstly, two reference histograms
are calculated as the average of real access and mask attack
samples in the training set and the features extracted from
test samples are compared with these two using χ2 metric,
resulting in two distances: Dreal and Dmask. The final score
is computed as Dmask −Dreal.
In [21] and [23], an SVM classifier is used with a linear
kernel. SVM classification is also applied in our previous
work [26], but the kernel type is chosen to be the radial basis
function. In this study, a comparison between the two kernels
is made with respect to their mask attack detection capabilities.
Additionally, Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is tested
in addition to χ2 and SVM. Prior to LDA classification,
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is applied to reduce
dimensionality while preserving 99% of the energy.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Two types of experiments are conducted on both databases:
• Face verification experiments in which success rates
of spoofing attacks with 3D masks are assessed using
baseline face recognition algorithms.
• Anti-spoofing experiments in which mask attack/real face
classification accuracies of aforementioned counter mea-
sure methods are measured.
The experimental setup is summarized in the diagram in
Figure 4, listing the algorithms used (both from previous
studies and newly introduced) in face recognition and anti-
spoofing modules. It also displays the result categories with
respect to the probe image types and the decisions taken.
All of these algorithms are implemented using the free
signal-processing and machine learning toolbox Bob4. The
source code for the experiments is available as one of its
satellite packages5.
A. Vulnerability to spoofing with 3D masks
Before going into details of the experimental protocols and
the obtained results for each database, the utilized performance
measurements for these experiments will be briefly explained.
4http://www.idiap.ch/software/bob/
5Code available at: http://pypi.python.org/pypi/maskattack.study
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Fig. 4. A diagram showing face recognition and anti-spoofing modules with previously proposed algorithms for 3D mask attacks and the ones additionally
studied in this paper. It also presents the result categories based on the probe image type and the decision taken by each module.
1) Performance metrics:
As shown in Figure 4, a binary decision is made in a
face verification system whether to accept or reject the input
face. Hence, simply two types of errors exist: False rejection
occurs when a genuine user is rejected while being compared
to its own template and false acceptance occurs when an
impostor is accepted despite claiming a false identity. With
the introduction of the spoofing attacks, another error emerges
referred as spoofing false acceptance which arises when an
attack is successful and gains access. The rate of false rejection
errors to the over all attempts from genuine users are measured
as False Rejection Rate (FRR). Similarly, False Acceptance
Rate (FAR) and Spoofing False Acceptance Rate (SFAR) are
calculated as the percentage of false acceptance and spoofing
false acceptance occurrences in all zero-effort (impostor) and
mask attacks, respectively.
In our baseline verification experiments, the decision thresh-
olds are selected as the operating points at which FRR is equal
to FAR. The Equal Error Rates (EER) and SFAR values at this
threshold are computed and reported.
2) Verification experiments on the Morpho database:
Face verification experiments on the Morpho database are
included in this study with the purpose of reproducing pre-
viously published results for comparison. Towards this end,
LBP-2D, LBP-2.5D and TPS-3D algorithms are implemented
and tested via the same all vs all protocol used in [22]
and [23] in order to establish baseline systems’ verification
performance and vulnerability to 3D mask attacks. For real
accesses, each sample is matched against all other samples in
the real subset of the database and the generated scores are
grouped as genuine if the samples belong to the same client or
impostor, otherwise. Contrarily to what was proposed in [22],
for mask attacks, each sample is only matched against real
samples that belong to the target identity, resulting in a third
group of scores, namely attack scores.
Due to the fact that the database is utilized as a whole and no
divisions are proposed for training, development or testing in
the previous analyses [22], the decision (EER) thresholds are
determined a posteriori using all genuine and impostor scores
obtained. Finally, at the same threshold, the rate of successful
mask attacks (SFAR) are computed.
Two sets of experiments are conducted with the three
algorithms implemented. Firstly, thanks to the collaboration of
the authors of [22] who gave us access to their preprocessed
data, the baseline face recognition algorithms are applied on
their 2D and 2.5D images. It could not be done for 3D due to
large data size. This practice enables us to compare different
implementations of same algorithms, stripped from the effects
of the pre-processing step.
In the second set of experiments, preprocessed images
from [22] are replaced with images obtained by our prepro-
cessing procedure. Similar to prior work, our preprocessing in
2D consists of cropping and geometrically normalizing face
images according to eye positions. On the other hand, for 3D
face models, only cropping is applied using a sphere centred at
the nose tip and the hole filling and smoothing steps employed
in [22] are omitted.
Setting the central axis of view of the camera in the direction
of the camera’s Z axis, the depth maps are obtained by
measuring the distances of 3D facial points from the camera’s
XY plane. For this reason, the preprocessing applied on the 3D
data also affects the resulting 2.5D depth maps. No additional
preprocessing is employed.
3) Verification experiments on 3DMAD database:
For 3DMAD database, ISV method on 2D and 2.5D images
and ICP method on 3D models are also tested, in addition to
the algorithms employed for Morpho database.
Contrary to 3D scanner outputs which are precise mea-
surements of the facial shape, the 3D reconstruction of face
models from 2D images is prone to error and noise. Due to this
nature of the production process, the masks can have different
levels of resemblance to the target persons. For this reason, in
order to fully analyse the spoofing capabilities of the masks,
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TABLE I
VERIFICATION AND SPOOFING RATES: (1) REPORTED RESULTS IN [22] ON MORPHO (2) PREPROCESSING FROM [22] AND OUR IMPLEMENTATION ON
MORPHO (3) OUR PREPROCESSING AND IMPLEMENTATION ON MORPHO (4) OUR PREPROCESSING AND IMPLEMENTATION ON 3DMAD.
LBP (2D) LBP (2.5D) TPS (3D)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
EER 5.90% 6.16% 6.54% 4.92 % 7.27% 7.69% 17.63% 18.81% 3.85% - 9.58% 13.28%
SFAR - 51.27% 59.94% 28.04% - 76.93% 41.98% 11.64% - - 54.09% 16.61%
a different protocol is adopted in which they are handled
separately using leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV). For
this purpose, the experiments are done in 17-folds, one for
each mask. In each fold, the identity of the mask under analysis
is taken out of the client set and the samples that belong
to this user constitute the test set. From the remaining 16
clients, the first 8 is assigned to the training and the rest to
the development set. In this way, training and development
sets are kept maximally similar for all folds.
Among all algorithms, the only method that requires training
is ISV. Hence, the real samples in the training set (from
sessions 1 and 2) are used to train the UBM-GMM and to
estimate the within-client variation of ISV.
The real access samples in the development set are utilized
to obtain genuine and impostor score distributions, by using
the session 1 samples for enrolment and session 2 samples
for probing. With these scores, operating thresholds are deter-
mined at EER to assess baseline verification performances.
Lastly, attack scores are calculated for the mask samples
in the test set, by again using the session 1 for enrolment,
but this time session 3 for probing. All mask attack samples
are matched with all enrolment samples since they all share a
single identity.
Prior to verification tests, the data samples are preprocessed.
Similar to preprocessing employed in 2D for Morpho database,
2D texture images in 3DMAD are also cropped, geometrically
normalized using the eye positions supplied in the database
and converted to grayscale.
For the 3D mode, a more complex preprocessing technique
is utilized in order to obtain denser and more complete face
models from the raw Kinect output. For this purpose, for each
depth video in the database, every 30 frames are accumulated
into one model, resulting in 10 face models per video. The
process is illustrated in Figure 5. Again for 2.5D, 3D models
obtained after preprocessing are utilized to obtain the depth
maps and no further action is required.
Before the accumulation of frames, firstly the raw depth
data is converted to real world coordinates using the internal
calibration parameters that are shipped with the Kinect device
used for recording. Next, the obtained point clouds are cropped
with a sphere of radius 8cm, centered at the nose tip. The
nose tip is identified as the point with minimum depth value
in the proximity of the eyes (using the eye positions included
in the database). Then, each cropped face model is rigidly
transformed and aligned with the first frame of that video using
ICP method. Finally, all points in all 30 frames are collected
into bins in a 300× 300 grid of size 15cm× 15cm which is
centred at the nose tip. The accumulated model is obtained by
Fig. 5. Top: Raw color and depth images obtained with Kinect and the
point cloud computed by mapping the depth data to the world coordinates.
Middle: Texture map, depth map and point cloud from a single frame
after cropping. Bottom: Texture map, depth map and point cloud after 30
frames are accumulated and post-processed. Texture maps are not used in the
experiments, they are included here only for visualization purposes.
taking the average of each bin. The grid also provides us the
depth map, which is created by taking the z value at each bin
(pixel) as intensity.
This method results in a denser and smoother facial shape
due to accumulation and averaging, respectively. But, it can
still be noisy and include holes. To overcome these issues,
holes are filled via linear interpolation and then bilateral
smoothing is applied.
In order to have equal number of texture and shape samples,
every 30th frame is used for the experiments in 2D. For
each fold of the LOOCV, 800 real access samples from
two non-overlapping sets of 8 users are used for training
and development, whereas for testing, 100 mask samples are
matched against 100 enrolment samples. In total, 2550 samples
are obtained and utilized for each mode (2D, 2.5D and 3D).
4) Results:
The verification and spoofing results in terms of EER and
SFAR for the Morpho and 3DMAD databases using LBP-2D,
LBP-2.5D and TPS-3D algorithms are given in Table I. As
explained before, SFAR values are obtained as the percentage
of successful attacks that achieve higher similarity score than
the EER threshold overall spoofing attempts.
EER rates reported in [22] are given in column (1) of Ta-
ble I. SFAR values are not provided in [22] so they are omitted.
Columns (2) and (3) give the results for our two sets of
experiments on Morpho database: first using the preprocessed
images from [22] and second using our preprocessing. Lastly,
in column (4), EER and SFAR rates are given for 3DMAD
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(a) LBP method - 2D (b) LBP method - 2.5D (c) TPS method - 3D
(d) ISV method - 2D (e) ISV method - 2.5D (f) ICP method - 3D
Fig. 6. EER and SFAR values obtained separately for each mask using the algorithms indicated in the sub-captions. (EER bars in (d) are too low to be
visible.)
for comparison.
Contrarily to Morpho database, the performance measure-
ments on 3DMAD are done separately for each mask (as
explained previously) and the average values of all folds are
computed. More detailed results for each mask separately is
reported in Figure 6 (first row). Figure 6 also provides the
results of verification and spoofing experiments conducted on
3DMAD (second row) with new face recognition algorithms
(ISV-2D, ISV-2.5D and ICP) as a comparison.
In Figure 6, ISV is observed to have much lower verification
errors in both 2D and 2.5D compared to its LBP counterpart.
The average EER values for ISV are found to be 0.05% and
3.70% in 2D and 2.5D, respectively, whereas they are 4.92%
and 18.81% for LBP. Similarly, the ICP method (EER of
3.99%) is found to perform better than TPS (EER of 13.28%)
in 3D mode. It indicates that the proposed baseline algorithms
are more advanced than the previous ones.
5) Discussion:
The obtained EER values presented in column (2) of Ta-
ble I show minimal differences compared to (1), indicating a
successful reproduction of previously reported results.
Since the pre-processing for 2D images is very similar to
the one employed in [22], EER values for 2D face recognition
algorithms do not change significantly between columns (2)
and (3) of Table I. On the other hand, an increase is observed
in SFAR which implies sensitivity to cropping in mask attack
detection. This phenomenon can be explained by the varying
mask appearance according to whether the mask edges are
visible or not in the facial image.
On the other hand, in 2.5D and 3D modes, the ommision of
the hole filling and smoothing steps employed in [22] causes a
deterioration in verification rates. Additionally, the comparison
between SFAR values of (2) and (3) in the 2.5D experiments
shows that spoofing performances are also adversely affected.
Similar to real accesses, mask attacks also fail to be recognized
by the system without appropriate preprocessing.
When the two databases are compared in columns (3) and
(4) of Table I, both baseline verification and spoofing results
for 3DMAD are found to be worse than Morpho when 2.5D
or 3D data is used. This is expected partly because Kinect
acquisition of depth is of much lesser quality compared to the
laser scanner used for Morpho database. For SFAR values,
another reason is that 3D shape accuracy of the masks in
3DMAD are not as high as the ones in the Morpho database,
since they are approximately reconstructed from a couple of
2D images instead of being printed from real face models. This
degradation in the mask quality is also reflected in spoofing
performances in 2D.
If we look at SFAR values for each mask in 3DMAD
(Figure 6), three immediate conclusions can be drawn:
• The baseline algorithms proposed in this paper have much
higher verification rates with respect to the ones used in
previous studies.
• The spoofing performances differ greatly not only be-
tween masks but also between modes and algorithms.
• The vulnerability to mask attacks (i.e. average SFAR of
all masks or number of masks that achieve SFAR of 20%
or higher) is greater for more successful face verification
algorithms, namely ISV-2D, ISV-2.5D and ICP.
For all methods tested, the baseline success rates for verifi-
cation are observed not to fluctuate too much between folds. In
fact, the average of standard deviations for all 6 experiments
is only 0.89%. This suggests that similar score distributions
are achieved among folds, allowing more reliable comparisons
for the masks.
The results show that spoofing capabilities vary substantially
10 JOURNAL SUBMISSION UNDER REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2013
between masks, as well as modes and algorithms. The varia-
tion among different masks occurs because of the production
quality and resemblance differences. For each method and
mode, quite diverse SFAR values can be observed in Figure 6,
varying between 0% and 98.4%.
Additionally, for a fixed mask-algorithm pair the results also
vary with respect to the utilized mode. For instance, let us look
at the mask #11. With the ISV method in 2D, 96.68% of the
spoofing attempts using this mask are successful, whereas in
2.5D, this ratio is only 7.52%. Likewise for the mask #10 with
LBP method, SFARs in 2D and 2.5D are found to be 0.56%
and 57.4%, respectively. These variations comes from the fact
that 3D shape accuracies and texture qualities of the masks are
independent from each other. For this reason, it is possible for
a mask to present a high threat to a 2D face recognition system
while failing in 2.5D or 3D.
Even more interestingly, the spoofing performance of a
mask in one mode can also change with respect to the
employed verification algorithm. Same kind of data from the
same mask can be accepted using one algorithm and rejected
in another. For example, in 3D mode if we compare the
sFARs for the mask #5, two fifth of the attacks are successful
with ICP (40.76%), but a very small portion is above the
verification threshold with TPS (4.04%). A similar relationship
exists also for the mask #17, but in the opposite direction.
As another example, cropped 2D samples for the mask #17
achieve 76.32% SFAR with ISV and 4.44% with LBP. When
we look deeper, we realize that this variation is partially
related to the propensity of the users to contribute to FRR,
which are classified as goats by Doddington et al. [37]. For
the mask #5 given as an example above, the FRR for real
access samples which share the same identity as the mask
is much higher (32.52%) for TPS method, compared to ICP
(8.84%). The reluctance to recognition for this user with TPS
technique persists also for his mask. On the other hand, of
course there are other variant factors between the algorithms
that cannot be properly measured, such as the discriminative
power or generalization ability of the extracted features in
different specific cases.
Considering the verification rates vs spoofing performances,
one would expect a direct proportion relation because a
system which easily accepts the zero-effort (impostor) attacks
should logically be even more susceptible to spoofing attacks.
However, the experimental results show the opposite; that the
systems with lower EER have more serious vulnerabilities
and these two aspects are in fact inversely correlated. This
phenomenon can be explained by the generalization ability
of the advanced face recognition algorithms to a wide range
of within-class variations. For instance, ISV suppresses these
detrimental variations and hence it can generalize well to new
unseen test samples, as can be seen from the excellent scores
obtained. But this also results in an ”ability” to recognize a
mask, even if it is distorted and not exactly the same as the
real person, making the ISV method the most vulnerable one
among the others.
B. Anti-spoofing for 3D mask attacks
In order to assess mask attack/real access classification rates
of different LBP-based features extracted from 2D, 2.5D and
3D data and various classification methods, extensive tests are
conducted.
1) Performance metrics:
As depicted in Figure 4, being another binary (real/mask)
classification problem, anti-spoofing also contains two types
of errors: False Fake where the real accesses are classified
as mask attacks (FFR) and False Living where the mask
attacks are classified as real accesses (FLR). The performance
measurements are done differently for Morpho and 3DMAD
databases, due to their dissimilar experimental protocols.
In the prior studies, the Morpho database is divided into
two non-overlapping partitions for training and testing. Since
no development set is used, the accuracies are given as the best
possible performance calculated on the test set and in terms of
the area under the ROC curve (AUC) which is a plot of FLR
vs 1-FFR (i.e. True Fake Rate). For the accuracy calculation,
Equation 1 is utilized where τ is the decision threshold and Nr
and Nm are number of real access and mask attack attempts.
Acc = max
τ
(
1− FFR(τ) ·Nm + FLR(τ) ·Nr
Nm +Nr
)
(1)
On the other hand, the LOOCV protocol employed for
3DMAD allows us to determine the decision threshold on
the development set. For this purpose, the operating point
is obtained where FFR is equal to FLR, using the scores
obtained from development samples. At the same threshold,
FFR and FLR rates are also calculated for the test set. For both
development and test sets, Half Total Error Rates (HTER) are
computed according to Equation 2 as the final performance
metric.
HTER(τ∗) =
FFR(τ∗) + FLR(τ∗)
2
(2)
2) Anti-spoofing experiments on the Morpho database:
With the purpose of creating a connection to prior studies
and reproducing the reported results, we implemented micro-
texture analysis algorithm employed in both [21] and [23] and
conduct classification experiments with the same training and
test partitions used in these studies.
In [23], the authors also report the results for the fusion of
2D and the 2.5D information at feature and score levels. They
conclude that taking the weighted sum of z-normalized scores
performs better. Unfortunately, z-normalization parameters are
computed and the weights are optimized using the test set. This
assumes prior knowledge on the score distributions and mode
reliabilities and hence it biases the results favourably.
In our experiments, we choose to skip normalization and we
use same weights (0.6 for 2D and 0.4 for 2.5D) as proposed
by the authors in [23].
For the sake of completeness, we additionally test other LBP
types and classifiers mentioned previously in Section V on the
Morpho database. This allows us to compare the previously
employed algorithms on Morpho database with the new ones.
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(c) SVM results using linear and RBF kernels (2D)
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(d) LBP features extracted per-image (2.5D)
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(e) LBP features extracted per-block (2.5D)
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(f) SVM results using linear and RBF kernels (2.5D)
Fig. 7. ROC curves obtained using different LBP features and classifiers for Morpho database. (In (c) and (f) LBP features are extracted per-block.)
3) Anti-spoofing experiments on 3DMAD database:
In order to analyse the LBP-based anti-spoofing methods
for 3DMAD, LOOCV method is adopted again. Mask attack
detection performances are measured using each mask sepa-
rately for 9 different sets of LBP features extracted from both
2D and 2.5D data.
Similar to face verification experiments, in each fold of
LOOCV, the identity of the mask under analysis is assigned
to the test set while the remaining 16 clients are divided in
non-overlapping equal partitions for training and development.
For each one of the 17 folds, three different classifiers
(χ2, LDA, SVM with linear kernel) are trained using the
training set and the classification scores are computed for
both development and test sets. The decision threshold is
determined as the operating point where FFR is equal to FLR
in the development set and HTERs are calculated for both sets
at this threshold.
Finally, for each LBP feature and for each classifier, the
average values and the standard variations are computed for
HTER rates of all folds.
4) Results:
The obtained results for reproduction of prior work are
given in Table II. Although the same preprocessed and cropped
images are used in both experiments, the results show that our
implementation fails to reproduce the exact or close results
reported in [23]. We hypothesize that this disparity between the
accuracies may be caused by the faulty LBP implementation6
used by the authors. A similar occurrence was investigated
6http://www.cse.oulu.fi/CMV/Downloads/LBPMatlab
TABLE II
REPORTED [23] AND OBTAINED RESULTS ON MORPHO DATABASE USING
MICRO-TEXTURE ANALYSIS APPROACH IN [5] (BETTER PERFORMANCE IS
IMPLIED BY HIGHER ACCURACY, HIGHER AUC AND LOWER EER.)
Reported [23] Obtained
Data type 2D 2.5D Fusion 2D 2.5D Fusion
Accuracy 89.4% 82.4% 93.5% 97.0% 74.9% 94.5%
AUC 95.6% 91.5% 97.8% 99.4% 84.5% 98.9%
EER - - - 5.0% 27.1% 7.0%
in [14] and it was shown that the Matlab implementation
of LBP responds unexpectedly in certain conditions, whereas
they are handled correctly in the Bob toolbox that is used in
our work. This may lead to completely different LBP codes
in more than 5% of all computed codes.
In our experiments, the anomaly affects the results adversely
for mask attack detection in 2.5D. On the other hand, it pro-
duces better performance in 2D. Further analysis is needed to
accurately identify the reasons behind this behaviour, however
this investigation is not possible until the complete source code
for [23] is available.
With our score-level fusion method, the EER is found to
be 7.02% using the micro-texture analysis approach in [5].
The fusion in fact influenced the success rates negatively.
With our implementation, 2D grayscale images outperform the
2.5D depth maps to the extent that simple fusion methods are
inadequate.
The resulting ROC curves (FLR vs FFR) computed on the
testing partition of Morpho database with all other LBP types
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(a) LBP features extracted per-image (2D)
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(c) LBP features extracted per-image (2.5D)
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(d) LBP features extracted per-block (2.5D)
Fig. 8. ROC curves obtained using different LBP features and classifiers for 3DMAD database. The ROC curves are computed for the same threshold range
for all masks and the average curves are calculated after merging development and test scores. For SVM, linear kernel is utilized.
and classifiers implemented are given in Figure 7. Since the
database is only divided into training and testing sets in the
previous studies, ROC curves are preferred to display the error
rates at all possible operating points.
As for 3DMAD database, the results are given with two
different plots. Firstly, in order to be able to compare the anti-
spoofing performances with Morpho database, the ROC curves
are presented in Figure 8 for each LBP type and classifier.
Since an operating point is not required to be calculated for
ROC plots, development set is not need anymore and hence,
these curves are generated by merging the development and
test sets in each fold and finally taking their average. Secondly,
using the development set to find the EER threshold, the
average HTER rates for 2D and 2.5D images are computed
and displayed in Figure 9 as a bar graph where the variability
of the HTER values are graphically represented by error bars.
5) Discussion:
Several main points can be inferred from the results on the
Morpho database as it can be seen in Figure 7:
1) Mask detection performance in 2D images are much
higher than the 2.5D images.
2) Block-based extraction of LBP features ameliorates the
classification rates, especially for 2D images.
3) It is not possible to conspicuously point out one of the
classifiers as the best among the three, but we can claim
that SVM and LDA mostly draw ahead of χ2.
4) Between extended LBP types, modified LBP delivers
the best performance in all settings. Despite its shorter
length (531), this descriptor is even better than the multi-
scale LBP (833) [5], except when per-image feature
extraction is utilized for 2.5D depth maps (Figure 7-d).
5) For SVM classification, utilization of linear kernel yields
to better results.
If we look at the findings from 3DMAD experiments given
in Figure 9 in parallel with Morpho database:
1) For block-based and multi-scale LBP approaches, per-
formance of 2D images are again higher than the 2.5D
images, on the other hand for LBP features extracted
per-image, 2.5D images are observed to provide better
results.
2) In accordance with previous observations, extraction of
LBP features per-blocks is positively effectual for both
2D and 2.5D modes.
3) Again similarly to results with Morpho, SVM and LDA
are better than χ2, but this time LDA mostly yields to
lower error rates than SVM.
4) For 2D images, all block-based and multi-scale LBP
features yield to very good results except for dLBP.
Particularly, regular block-based LBP shows an excel-
lent performance with 0.12± 0.47% error, followed by
modified block-based LBP (0.50 ± 0.95%) again using
LDA. Similarly for 2.5D images, LDA gives lowest error
rates for almost all LBP types, the best of them being
again regular block-based (3.91±6.04%) LBP, followed
by multi-scale (5.0± 8.61%) LBP.
When the results are analysed closely, the deviations are
observed to be larger for test sets, compared to development
sets. This points to a serious generalization problem for most
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Fig. 9. The HTERs of different LBP types applied per-image (I) and per-block (B) for 2D and 2.5D images in 3DMAD are presented with error bars, where
the uncertainties are indicated by standard deviations.
of the tested counter measures, especially when the 2.5D depth
maps are utilized. For 2D images, regular and modified block-
based LBP with LDA behave as wanted, having almost no
deviation, but unfortunately, this is not the case for any of the
methods using 2.5D images. This also shows us that reporting
best possible performance or AUC on the test set can be highly
misleading. Generalization should be handled and analysed as
seriously as differentiability.
VII. CONCLUSION
Spoofing attacks continue to be a security threat for biomet-
ric recognition systems and face is among the most vulnerable
traits due to its high accessibility. Majority of previous studies
in face spoofing focus on preventing 2D attacks performed
by displaying printed photos or replaying recorded videos on
mobile devices. However, utilization of 3D masks for face
spoofing attacks has become easier and cheaper with the
advancements in 3D reconstruction and printing technologies.
In our paper, we aim to contribute to the current state
of the art in the research domain of 3D mask attacks. For
this purpose, we extend our previous work [26] in three
directions; firstly by assessing spoofing performances on 2.5D
and 3D systems, secondly by analysing each mask separately
with LOOCV and lastly experimenting on another 3D mask
spoofing database which has been used in some of the previous
studies but is not publicly available, in addition to 3DMAD.
The parallel evaluations of LBP based anti-spoofing methods
on these two databases allow us to associate previously pub-
lished results on the Morpho database with our current work
and with possible future studies on 3DMAD.
The face verification experiments conducted on 2D, 2.5D
and 3D baseline systems reveal their vulnerability to spoofing
attacks using facial masks. Additionally, they help us to see
the different nature of the two types of masks used in two
databases. The results show that the masks in 3DMAD for
which the facial shapes are reconstructed from 2D images are
not as capable as the ones in Morpho database for which he
facial shapes are obtained via a 3D scanner.
Furthermore, the success rates of LBP based features in 3D
mask attack detection are assessed via exhaustive tests using
three different classifiers. The results for both 2D and 2.5D
images indicate an advantage in the block-based approach.
Among different LBP types tested, modified LBP is observed
to deliver best results for Morpho database, despite its shorter
length compared to multi-scale LBP which was proposed in
previous publications. On the other hand in 3DMAD, regular
block-based LBP shows the best performance for both 2D and
2.5D data. As for classification, LDA and SVM are found to
be better than χ2, while LDA is proved to be best in case of
3DMAD database.
A possible extension to this work is to search for more
generalizable algorithms to detect the mask attacks, in or-
der to avoid large variations in error rates. The obtained
score distributions for 3DMAD are observed to vary between
development and test sets, resulting in suboptimal decision
thresholds and hence, increased error rates.
Another point that needs to be deliberated is the utilization
of mask attack samples for training the anti-spoofing systems.
Ideally, a countermeasure algorithm against spoofing should be
able to decide whether the face image captured by the sensor
belongs to a real face or not, regardless of the attack type.
Because it is not realistic for a biometric system to employ a
different anti-spoofing module for each attack type. In all of
the previous works and in this study, the classifiers are trained
using both real and attack samples.
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